‘Killing a fly with a Sledge Hammer’ Nairobi Metropolitan Command and the fight against Terrorism

The History and Context of addressing Terrorism in Kenya

Kenya has suffered a number of terrorist attacks since 1975 . This is when the first reported terrorist attack at the Starlight Night Club( current Integrity Center) and another at the Information Bureau near the Hilton and at the OTC Bus station that caused combined fatalities at 27 persons.

Since then, Kenya has experienced a number of other attacks in the 1980s, at the Norfolk Hotel, the 1990s perhaps saw the worst attack on Kenyan soil with the bombing of the American Embassy in 1998 which caused a record 224 fatalities and over 5000 injuries. There have been a number of other attacks including Paradise Hotel Kikambala(2002), in Nairobi at the City gate restaurant(2007), in 2010, there were three terrorist attacks in Nairobi’s Uhuru Park, at Kampala Coach station and in various other places. Most of these were linked to the al shabab terrorist group, the in lawless Somalia.

Kenya sent her forces into Somalia after a series of attack on tourists and other public spaces in various parts of the country. The incursion into Somalia was intended to forestall any future attacks by disrupting the al-shabab network at source. Kenyan Defence Forces are still in Somalia on that mission which has since been taken over by the African Union as the African Union Mission in Somalia(AMISOM).
The sporadic attacks on public spaces were succeeded by the attack on West-gate shopping mall in Westland suburbs of Nairobi. This attack caused more that seventy fatalities. The Westgate attack was a test case on the capabilities of the various agencies tasked with the fight against terrorism. Even though there is now reliable information to the effect that there was ample intelligence, this was never acted on .The rescue and recovery operation was fumbled and at best demonstrated the incapacities of our agencies to deal with terrorism and especially the capacity for disaster management and response.

But more importantly it demonstrated the inappropriateness of using the military in such operations because available information indicate that the entry of the military in the operation worsened than resolved the crisis.

Responses to Westgate and Establishment of the Nairobi Metropolitan Command

The West-Gate attack in September 2013 was responded to by what the president called a Multi-Agency combined force drawn from various agencies mandated with responding to National disasters and security threats. The initial response by the General Service Unit RECCE Unit we have reliably learnt was very effective and managed to contain the attackers to one part of the mall within a short time after the attack. But the entry of the Kenya Defence Forces which has not been explained prolonged the rescue and recovery to the extent that there were perhaps more fatalities than might have been if the RECCE Squad had been allowed to complete their initial operation. The president promised and has not delivered on a Commission of Inquiry that would have highlighted acts of omission and commission that might have take place prior to, during and in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks. Much of the investigations available is from the Parliamentary Inquiry which held sessions with all the Security Agencies.

The Parliamentary Report has in addition identified a number of other Agencies which have in their acts of omission made it easy for terror groups to plan and affect their attacks and other acts of terrorism. The Report has essentially apportioned blame for the attack on a number of Agencies; the Police for not acting on intelligence that was availed to it and the Kenya Defence Forces for the mismanagement of the rescue and recovery operations. Other agencies include the Departments of Immigration, Refugee Affairs and Registration of Persons which due to corruption have made it possible for terrorist agents to move into the country without being detected. Other Departments including the National Intelligence Service have been singled out for providing timely information and intelligence that was not acted upon occasioning the situation the country witnessed at Westgate. It is on this basis that we made a number of recommendations to the Parliamentary Inquiry. The recommendations were made with the view of strengthening its report which in turn would be a basis for reform and/or re-organization of the various Agencies to thwart possible future threats. The recommendations included among others the following a) need for a coordination mechanism for responding to national disasters and security threats as well as sharing of intelligence and other resources; b)enhancement of the capacities(resources, facilities and equipments)of various security agencies that are undertaking useful functions in securing the country and averting threats to homeland security; c) conducting an evaluation of various other Agencies(including, the Departments of Immigration, Refugee Affairs, Customs and Border Control) whose work and operations directly touches on National Security with the view of placing them under the Department of Interior; d) the restructuring of the Provincial Administration as envisaged in the Constitution of Kenya 2010 and Section 17 of the Sixth Schedule as a compliment to National Security Organs; e)advocated for further resourcing(financial, equipment and other facilities) of the National Security Agencies in order discharge their functions more efficiently, and f)emphasized the need to respect the Constitution with regard to the deployment of Kenya Defence Forces in Internal/Domestic security operations.

A number of these recommendations and other from various actors who addressed the Parliamentary Inquiry have been presented in their final report that was tabled in Parliament in December 2013.

Nairobi Metropolitan Command
At a meeting with the Chief of General Staff and other Senior Military Officers, the President announced the formation of the Nairobi Metropolitan Command of the KDF to address among other issues, combat terrorism and especially in urban centers, drug trafficking and spiraling crime. This development in our view will work to undermine other Agencies including the National Police Service and the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit, the National Intelligence Service as well as other Specialised security formations that are working to combat drug trafficking and general crime. We are persuaded that whereas the President’s decision might be well-meaning in view of the increased cases of crime, terrorism and related acts, the best way to address this situation should essentially be through the resourcing of the various Services who are otherwise undertaking a commendable job even in the prevailing circumstances.

With a fast reforming Judiciary, the President should have been best counseled to act to address the outstanding issues regarding the acceleration of the Police Service reforms and resources. We appreciate that the President is dealing with a number of spill-over issues from the previous administration regarding resourcing of the police service best illustrated by the corruption surrounding the Police Forensic laboratory and procurement of plant and equipment. We are however convinced that the response from the Uhuru Administration should not be to run away from the real issues pertaining to Police Service reforms but to confront them.

We are of this view for the following other reasons:

1)Nature of Terrorist threats –the current and future terrorist threats require more of intelligence-led policing than application of force. The WestGate and the recent Pangani bus explosion attest to the nature of terror threats faced by this country which the Miliotary is ill-equipped to address. The Parliamentary Inquiry has in its report explicated the nature and manifestations of these threats. Other than the disruption of the al-shabab network within Somalia, KDF is ill suited for the evolving nature of terrorist threats which have taken an undefined nature. These are the kind of threats for which other Agencies are best trained for.
2)KDF as an anti- terrorist response mechanism- we have learned from the experience of Westgate that the entry of KDF complicated and fumbled the emergency rescue and recovery operations. There is evidence that KDF was ill-suited and /or prepared for the operation and that the operations at West gate should have been left to the competence of the RECCE Squad which is best trained for similar built environment situations.

3)KDF’s constitutional mandate- the framers of the Kenya Constitution 2010 have assigned each of the Services specific roles for which they are trained and well suited. Whereas we are persuaded by the use of the military in operations like the ones in Northern Kenya where a combination of the terrain and equipment does not allow the Police Service to be effective, the situation in Nairobi and other urban centers for which the Metropolitan Command is being established demand for a different approach.

4)The National Police Service, the Anti-terrorism Police Unit and other specialized formations offer the best option for combating crime, drug trafficking and terrorist activities. These Units need to be resourced with better equipment and further training in order to effectively discharge their mandates.

The Parliamentary Inquiry Report has documented that there was intelligence sharing between the Agencies. We have reason to believe this position. We are in agreement with the conclusion of the report that the intelligence on imminent attacks was never acted upon. The West-Gate incident was therefore effective due to lack of timely actions by the other Agencies that were supposed to act on the intelligence provided. In our view addressing Terrorist threats using the military in view of this available knowledge and information is akin to trying to ‘kill a fly with a sledge hammer’.


Recommendations
We are of the persuasion that there is need to build and integrate the capabilities of our security agencies in order to advance our national interests. Our Defence Forces will continue to be the cornerstone in averting external threats but we must work to enhance the capacities of other agencies tasked with domestic/homeland security. We must support our diplomats who work to pursue our national interests, institutions that work to strengthen governance and human dignity, intelligence, policing and law enforcement agencies that unravel threats to Kenya’s security and reinforce the justice system to deal with those who seek to disrupt our way of life. These cannot be guaranteed by having the boots in the streets as envisaged in the Metropolitan Command. Experience from elsewhere has shown that the Military is best placed to play a complimentary role in the fight against terrorism and especially in a situation like we are confronted with.

We are therefore appealing to the President to review the decision to establish the Metropolitan Command because the functions assigned to this command are no different from ordinary policing. The fight against terrorism will never be won by the number of boots we have in the streets but by the level and quality of resources and equipment availed to the core agencies tasked to address the issue of terrorism. These include the National Police Service and the National Intelligence Service complimented by the military as the case is in Somalia.